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Impervious Saving Behavior
One argument made a few years ago by propo-
nentsoflargefederal tax cuts was thatthe resuIting
massive federal deficits could automatically be
financed bythe private sector. In part, the argu-
ment relied on the hypothesis thatthe fall in tax
rates wouId create an incentive for the private
sector to increase its saving rate, and that the
increase in privatesavingwould financethefeder-
al deficits and obviate any increase in market in-
terest rates.
Such arguments no longer appear in the financial
press becausethe reality is thatwe live in acountry
ofdeficientdomestic saving. This deficiency is
easiIy measured. It is simply the difference
between gross private domestic investment and
gross domestic saving in our national income
accounts. Gross saving is the sum ofgross private
saving (personal and business) and the saving of
the government sector.
In the second quarterofthis year gross private
saving totalled $663 biIIion. Added to the $54
biIIion surplus ofstate and local governments and
the $167 federal deficit-the "dissaving" ofthe
federal government, we find thatthe gross saving
ofthe entire economy in the second quarter of
1984 amounted to $550 billion, at an annual rate.
In contrast, gross private domestic investment
totalled $626 billion. Domestic investmentthere-
fore exceeded domestic saving. The balance of
about $76 billion was made up in essence by
borrowingfrom abroad. Foreigners can be viewed
as having provided about 12 percentofthe funds
needed to finance U.S. private investment in the
second quarter, oras having financed about45
percent ofthe federal deficit.
How the privatesectorsees thegovernment
Before the proponents of large federal tax cuts
made their claims about probable private sector
responses to increased federal deficits and higher
after-tax rates of return, they should have studied
the post-war behaviorofgross domestic private
saving. Despite recent economic events such as
changes in federal incometax rates and high real
interest rates, the gross domestic private saving
rate whether measured as a percentofGNPorof
national income has remained relatively stable.
From 1975 to 1983, gross domestic private saving
as a percentofgross national product varied
between 16.5 percentand 18.2 percent. In the last
three years, its rate has moved narrowly between
17.1 and 17.3 percent. The same stabilitydoes not
describe the governmentsaving rate. Since 1975,
federal, state and local financial positions com-
bined have yielded a government saving rate (as a
percentofGNP) that has ranged from about zero
in 1979 to negative 4 percent in 1983. Gross do-
mestic privatesaving, has, then, seemed insensi-
tive to the financial position ofthe government
sectoras well as tothe extraordinarilyhigh level of
real interest rates in recent years. (See Chart 1.)
While the gross domestic private saving rate has
been relatively stable, its twocomponents-
personal saving and business saving have not. As
noted by Edward F. Denison three decades ago,
personal saving and corporatesaving often appear
to move in opposite directions. In a sense, the
personal sector appears to incorporate the saving
behaviorofthe corporate sector in its own deci-
sions to save and to consume. This is not unrea-
sonable. Since the non-business (personal) sector
"owns" the corporate sector, it considers corpo-
rate saving, composed ofundistributed corporate
profits and depreciation ofcorporate and noncor-
porate business, a close substitute for personal
saving. This implies, as noted by Denison, that
personal consumption expenditures are unaffected
by corporate dividend behavior.
The offsetting saving behavior ofthe personal and
corporate sectors leads to stability in the gross
private domestic saving rate. The relationship is
clearly observable in the two saving rates in just
the last few years (Chart 2). Business saving as a
percentofGNP grew from 12.6 to 13.7 percent
between 1981 and 1983. Personal saving as a
percent ofGNP, on the other hand, fell from 4.6 to
3.6 percent from 1981 to 1983. The net effectwas
to produce gross private saving rates (as a percent
ofGNP) of 17.24, 17.07, and 17.30 percent in
1981,1982 and 1983, respectively.
Domestic private saving has truly been impervious
to the level ofreal interest rates in recentyears and
to the financial status ofthe federal government,FRBSF
whose deficits have nearly tripled duringthe
period from 1981 to 1983. While the personal
sectorseems to continueto incorporatethesaving
status ofthe business sector in its own saving
decisions, itappears to have disregarded the fi-
nancial status ofthe government sector.
Not internalizing government financial behavior
The debate overthe effect ofthe federal govern-
mentdeficiton the real economy centers on the
degree to which taxpayers recognize any current
and future costs associated with payingfor gov-
ernment expenditures with the sale ofbonds rather
than through immediate taxation. At the local
community level, one might argue thattaxpayers
quickly recognize that bond issuance will involve
a future financial burden to the local residents.
These residents would altertheir saving behavior
in recognition ofthe future financing burden. In a
sense, bond finance may be viewed as deferred
taxation. A similar argument applied to federal
deficits has gained popularity recently among
some academic economists. However, it is difficult
to observe any majorchange in private domestic
saving behavior in response to the outbreakof
large federal deficits.
The stability ofthe gross private saving rate in the
face offederal budget deficits amounting to 5-6
percentofGNp, and expected to remain inthe3-4
percent range for the next several years, is incon-
sistent with recent arguments promoted by some
academics that currentfederal deficits, entailing
future principal and interest servicing costs, are
equivalentto and interpreted by consumers as
future taxes. Their argument presupposes that
consumers realize that the only real "tax cut" is a
government spending cut. Since they recognize
this equivalence, accordingto the argument, they
would not have interpreted recent personal in-
come tax cuts as real tax cuts. Instead, they would
have recognized the need to obtain additional
interest-earningassets in ordertopay forthefuture
costs ofservicing the increased federal deficitand
saved all ofthe tax cut. The result should be a rise
in the gross private saving rate. Chart 1 shows that
in 1969 and 1975, for example, fhe gross private
savingrate and the governmentsaving rate moved
in opposite directions, as suggested by the theory.
Recent facts, however, do notsupport this argu-
ment. Between 1981 and 1983, the gross private
saving rate averaged 17.20 percent compared with
an average saving rate of 17.18 percent ofGNP
between 1975 and 1980. Thetax cutand resulting
federal deficitsdonotappearto havedisturbedthe
general stabilityofthegross private saving rate.
The saving gap
The apparent insensitivity ofthe gross private
saving rate to changes in after-tax rates ofreturn
means that gross domestic saving likely will fall
short ofgross private domestic investment ifthe
federal governmentgoes substantially into deficit.
The resulting shortfall maybe called the "domestic
savinggap." Thisgap totalled about$34 billion in
1983 and was closed by importingforeign capital,
observable in our large and growing current
account deficit.
The existence ofboth large federal deficits and
largecurrentaccountdeficits has sometimes led to
theclaims thattheformer "causes" the latter. This
is not necessarily true. The current account deficit
could decline significantly, that is, the saving gap
could close, even in the face of large federal defi-
cits ifdomestic private investment would decline
-thetextbook case of"crowdingout." Eliminat-
ingthe domestic saving gap therefore requires
either a fall in domestic investment or a reduction
in the federal deficit.
But is the current saving gap necessarily perni-
cious, something to be avoided? Not necessarily.
What we observe in the United States is that
capital investment is more cyclical and more
interest-sensitive than private saving. Hence, the
saving gap is altered by cyclical swings in invest-
ment. Forexample, between 1978 and 1982, the
ratio ofgross private domestic investmentto GNP
fell from almost 18 percentto 13.5 percent, while
the gross private saving rate was 17.3 and 17.1
percent.
The cyclical recovery beginning in late 1982
coupled with the reduction in after-tax interest
costs ofbusiness capital investmentand the result-
ing pick-up in investment led to the emergence of
a saving gap and the need for the u.s. to import
capital tofinancewhat has turned outtobealmost
a capital investment boom in 1984. The saving
gap currently reflects the very strong cyclical
growth in business capital investment as well as
the deficitstatus ofthe federal government. But
unlikeearlier recoveries, the saving gap is not
expected to decline because the government sav-
ingrate is notexpected tobecome less negative as
itdid between 1975 and 1979.Chart 1
Saving and Real Interest Rates
Chart 2
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Real interest rate defined as the l-yearTreasurybill rate less the
annual rate ofchange in theGNP price deflator.
In part, the present situation is not unlikewhat
occurred after the Civil War, when rapid U.S.
economic growth and a decliningprice levelled
to massive importation offoreign capital. From
1861 to 1899, the United States was more often
than not afinancial capital importer. Only in nine
years during this period did the United States
experience a capital outflow. And not until the
end ofthe 19th century did the United States turn
from importing to exporting financial capital. This
comparison ofsaving behavior in the 19thcentury
with that in 1984 is meantsimplytoemphasizethe
fact that rapid economic growth and low inflation
is often accompanied by capital importation,
particularly if rates of return on real and financial
investments are higherthan they are abroad,
which now appears to be the case.
The stability ofthe gross domestic private saving
rate in the United States means that asignificant
pick-up in capital investment would lead to a
cyclical shortfall ofprivate domestic saving avail-
able to finance private investment. The private
saving gap can be filled either by saving in the
government sectors or by importingofforeign
capital. In the long-run, it makes a considerable
difference howthe private saving gap is closed.
Interest payments on the federal debtto foreign
bond holders represent a real future tax burden to
U.5. citizens. One couId argue thaHhe heavy
importation offoreign capital is financing current
government consumption and notprivate invest-
ment and hence the deficit represen.ts the mort-
gagingoffuture income to pay forthis excess
consumption.
Tax policy implications
Changes in neither the personal income tax struc-
ture nor real after-tax interest rates have affected
the U.S. gross domestic private saving rate. As a
result, a large and possibly structural, that is, non-
cyclical, domestic saving gap hasemerged, result-
ing in U.S. dependence on foreign capital to
finance both capital formation and the deficitof
the federal government.
ShouId aggregate tax policybechanged to reduce
the saving gap? This is obviously asensitive and
politicallycharged question, butwe can conjec-
turethat as the tax cutseems to havehad noeffect
on the gross private saving rate, so a personal tax
increase would most likely leave it unchanged. If
the corporate tax rate is left unchanged, itis pos-
sible, although quite conjectural, that atax in-
crease on consumers alone might help close the
saving gap without greatly affecting the growth of
capital investment. That is, atax increase on con-
sumers might contribute to lowering the federal
deficitwithout changing the gross private saving
rate. Such achange intaxpolicywould recognize
the insensitivityof the gross private saving rate to
changes in taxes and real interest rate and the
sensitivityofcapital investment to both.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)











Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 182,490 - 214 6,465 5.1
Loans and Leases 1 6 163,448 - 314 8,093 7.3
Commercial and Industrial 48,660 30 2,697 8.2
Real estate 60,908 85 2,009 4.7
Loans to Individuals 29,734 84 3,083 16.2
Leases 5,047 24 - 16 - 0.4
U.s. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,876 86 - 631 - 7.0
Other Securities2 7,165 13 - 998 - 17.1
Total Deposits 192,998 - 359 2,001 1.4
Demand Deposits 47,172 - 162 - 2,065 - 5.8
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,290 - 40 - 2,041 - 9.1
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,644 - 240 - 131 - 1.4
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 133,182 43 4,197 4.5
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 37,985 - 13 - 1,612 - 5.7
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 41,120 4 2,955 10.8
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 21,923 1,710 - 1,084 - 6.6
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowing via FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately